Next:
The Future Just Happened
by Michael Lewis
When Michael
Lewis' Next:
The Future Just Happened first appeared
in the summer of 2001, I ignored it — partly because
I thought it was just an updated version of the
author's
previous book, The New New Thing, and partly because I somehow thought
it was a strained effort to explain why the Internet was going to revolutionize
the business world even though the dot-com euphoria had ended. But one of my
e-mail correspondents sent me a note indicating that it was actually a very
perceptive commentary on the social impact of the Internet, and that
it was very much worth reading. I'm glad I paid attention to the recommendation;
having read through it, I can report that it's one of those relatively rare
books whose pages are now festooned with Post-it notes, to remind me where
to
find the interesting passages.
Lewis is obviously aware of the collapse of the dot-com
stock market, and the backlash caused by that collapse;
indeed, he argues that many of us
have become so jaded and cynical that we're missing the deeper and long-lasting
impact of the Internet. Whether or not the Internet and
the Web fundamentally
transform the day-to-day operation of businesses is not Lewis' main concern:
he's more interested in the way it affects society. As
he puts it,
"What
was happening on the Internet buttressed a school thought in sociology known
as role theory. The role theorists argue that we have no "self" as
such. Our selves are merely the masks we wear in response to the social
situations in which we find ourselves. The Internet had offered up a
new set of social situations, to which people had responded by grabbing
for
a new set of masks."
But adults have typically invested a lot more of their ego and their personality
in whatever current set of masks they happen to be wearing; as a result,
it's more difficult for them to shed those masks and don new ones. Thus,
one of Lewis' more interesting insights (probably not a unique insight,
but nevertheless noteworthy) is the following:
" ...
It does seem to me that when capitalism encourages ever more
rapid change,
children enjoy one big advantage over adults: they haven't decided
who they are. They haven't sunk a lot of psychological
capital into a
particular self. When a technology comes
along that rewards people who are willing
to chuck overboard their old selves for new ones -- and it isn't
just the
Internet that does this: biotechnology offers many promising self-altering
possibilities — the people who aren't much invested in their
old selves have an edge. The things that get tossed
overboard with a twelve-year-old
self don't seem like much to give up at the time."
Lewis then proceeds
to illustrate this point with several stories and
examples in the remainder
of the book; the most interesting one,
in my opinion, was
his lengthy discussion of a 15-year-old New Jersey boy named Jonathan Lebed,
who had used the Internet to "promote" stocks from an AOL account
in his bedroom. Over a period of roughly six months, he made a profit of
some $800,000; it's worth noting that this was during a period when an awful
lot of people (but not me, alas) made an awful lot of money by doing nothing
more brilliant than investing in eBay or Nokia or Lucent. But the SEC was
incensed that young Lebed had posted phony messages (by using the multiple
"alias" identifications available on a single AOL account) to
generate enthusiasm for the stocks he had picked; with great fanfare and
publicity, they forced him to return "illicit gains" of some
$285,000 he had thus generated ... but they were utterly silent about the
fact that
they let him keep nearly half a million dollars of additional profits,
all of which had been accumulated from an initial investment of some $8,000.
As
Lewis describes it, what's most interesting about the case
is that young Lebed actually investigated many of
the companies
he invested in — i.e.,
visited their corporate headquarters, looked at their financial statements,
and listened to whatever CNBC had to say about them — and believed that
his activities of drumming up a lot of noise about the companies on various
Internet discussion boards was no different than what the "grownups" were
doing. And indeed, that is what the grownups are doing on Wall
Street: they're called analysts, and they were paid millions of dollars
to generate enthusiastic assessments about dot-com companies that, in
many
cases, had no profits and no revenues and no hope of ever generating revenues
and profits. The regulations and obstacles that prevented Lebed from
playing
in the grown-up's game — e.g., the various oversight mechanisms of the
SEC and other regulatory bodies seemed artificial, contradictory, and
in
many cases, hypocritical and downright bogus. So, given the power of anonymity
on the Internet, he simply ignored them.
I'm not in a position to say
whether Lebed really did act illegally or
unethically; Lewis carefully avoids making such a value judgment, too,
but he does leave a strong impression in the reader's mind that, at the
very
least, a double standard was involved. And he repeats that point with several
more stories, vignettes, and case studies. Throughout the whole discussion,
Lewis makes the point that it's not that the Internet caused these
situations to occur, but rather that it enabled pent-up demands
to be fulfilled. Thus, he argues that the Internet is not an evil influence
that seduced an innocent New Jersey teenager into doing wicked things on
Wall Street — and, in the process, seducing thousands of pure, innocent,
naive adults into purchasing stocks that he was recommending. On the contrary,
he argues that there has always been a pent-up demand by teenagers who
want
to flout a set of rules and regulations they view as arbitrary and hypocritical;
and there has always been a pent-up demand on the part of adults who have
come to believe (perhaps through the wicked influence of television and
Hollywood culture!) that they "deserve" to get rich quick, just
like all of those high-paid athletes and actors. The traditional forces
of society have generally prevented those demands from being fulfilled;
but the Internet has created a mechanism for putting their dreams into
action.
Though Lewis doesn't discuss this point, one obvious conclusion
that I draw from all of this is that the traditional forces of society
— i.e.,
the entrenched politicians, bureaucrats, and business interests who want
to protect and preserve their fortunes and their empires — will not only
punish the first few rebels, but will also do whatever they can to regulate
and circumscribe the revolutionary powers of a new force like the Internet.
Actually, Lewis does discuss this point, but in a rather roundabout
fashion: he argues that all of these activities occur on the "fringes" of
society; and when society then sucks those fringe activities into its maw,
the pioneers and explorers and rebels simply move further out into
the fringe area, to discover the next new disruptive force.
All in all, Next:
The Future Just Happened is a provocative, thought-provoking book.
Whether or not you agree with its conclusions, it's well worth reading
—
and I highly recommend it.